MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker 03/2024

China signals its willingness to play a proactive role Russia-Ukraine relations, if conditions are suitable

by Eva Seiwert

China has spent much of this year signaling that it is ready to play a more proactive diplomatic role should Moscow and Kyiv deem conditions right to discuss a negotiated settlement. Part of this process consists in promoting a peace framework and narrative that suits Beijing’s interests.

China published its 12-point "Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" in February 2023, ending its conspicuous silence in the first year of the war. Since then, Beijing has sent its Special Representative on Eurasian Affairs, Li Hui, to discuss the Russia-Ukraine war with governments in Europe, the Middle East and, over the summer of 2024, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia. In July, it welcomed Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba to Beijing as the first high-ranking Ukrainian official visitor since the start of the war. Kuleba spoke of a “clear sign that China is working to end [the] war in Ukraine” – only weeks after China skipped the Peace in Ukraine summit in Switzerland in June, with Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy even accusing Beijing of boycotting it.

China now campaigns for a new peace conference that includes the “equal participation of all parties”, as outlined in a further six-point proposal in May - published jointly with Brazil - on the “political settlement of the Ukraine crisis”. With other countries, including India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kenya, also lamenting Russia’s absence from the Swiss summit, China has been presenting the six-point-plan as a more promising roadmap to peace and one with the additional merit of being led from the Global South. On a visit to Brazil in late July, Li reported that 110 countries had already supported it.

Beijing sees advantages in becoming more involved 

China’s growing presence in discussions around the Russia-Ukraine conflict is driven by several factors. First, Beijing wishes to be seen as a more constructive player, which may be a response to continuing Western criticism and to sanctions on Chinese companies helping Russia’s war efforts. Offering its own proposals, however vague, enables Beijing to dismiss accusations of pro-Moscow bias and show willingness to engage in conflict resolution. It may also hope to sidestep criticism and avoid further sanctions.

Second, China may be positioning itself to take advantage of potential shifts in US foreign policy after the US presidential election in November. If Donald Trump beats Kamala Harris, the United States could end or reduce military assistance to Ukraine (some USD 55 billion since 2022) and leave Kyiv in a precarious position on the battlefield. Beijing knows this and seems intent on exploiting the current uncertainty to steer Kyiv towards peace negotiations that align with Chinese interests. Foremost of these is to place limitations on NATO influence beyond its current borders. Beijing may also see a more proactive role as a way to bring some improvements to its strained relations with Europe.

Finally, China wants to enhance its image as a globally responsible power and a representative of the Global South. Many countries in the Global South regard China’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts as less controversial than Washington’s, which faces criticism for double standards in its approach to the two conflicts. Furthermore, Beijing was instrumental in getting Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume diplomatic relations in 2023 and Hamas and Fatah to pledge Palestinian unity in July. Beijing wants to build on these successes by presenting itself as a more reliable and less controversial broker than Washington, thereby burnishing its standing and bolstering its wider ambition to reshape the global order.

The China-Russia partnership can complicate Beijing’s plans

But China’s close partnership with Russia will complicate any peace-making role Beijing seeks with Ukraine. Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed a joint statement in May on deepening the China-Russia “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era”, a laudatory label that China has used only for its relationship with Russia. The two countries regularly conduct joint military exercises, as many as 22 since February 2022. Meanwhile, Beijing supports Moscow’s war, at least indirectly, by providing vital dual-use goods and strengthening bilateral trade ties. 

Yet, while this stance is controversial in the West, many in the Global South have chosen a similar approach of neither recognizing Russia’s illegal annexations nor condemning Moscow’s actions. India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and many other states have refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia and maintained, or even strengthened, trade relations. However controversial China’s positioning on Russia-Ukraine is in Europe and the United States, many governments elsewhere are less wary. Still, it should not be forgotten that China will always advocate for a solution in line with its own vision of a reshaped “fair and reasonable multipolar world,” which it shares with only one of the conflict parties, Russia.

Beijing is preparing for a more active role

Ultimately, only Russia and Ukraine can decide to what extent China can influence the war. Only they can decide if they want peace talks and whom to accept as mediator. At present, neither seems inclined to negotiate an end to the war and both have sent mixed signals about China. Despite Kuleba’s praise for China, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said Beijing should apply more pressure on Moscow to end the war, not act as a mediator. Moscow has been equally unclear whether it would support China playing a bigger role.

Beijing currently has little leverage to alter Russia’s position, and even less so Ukraine’s. Based on Beijing’s previous approaches to conflict resolution, its role – if it materializes – would likely be limited to providing a setting for negotiations and bringing the parties to the table (as it did with Saudi Arabia and Iran), possibly within a wider multilateral effort that highlights its close relationships with other countries of the Global South.

Beijing’s recent diplomatic activities are intended to signal its openness to playing a more proactive role if asked by Ukraine and Russia. Beijing seems to be getting itself ready for the eventuality though, like everyone else, it cannot know if or when the combatants might indicate a willingness to negotiate an end to the war, or to accept China’s facilitation.